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Abstract
Randomized smoothing has achieved state-of-the-art certified robustness against
l2-norm adversarial attacks. However, it also leads to accuracy drop compared to
the normally trained models. In this work, we employ a Smoothed WEighted EN-
sembling (SWEEN) scheme to improve the performance of randomized smoothed
classifiers. We characterize the optimal certified robustness attainable by SWEEN
models. We show the accessibility of SWEEN models attaining the lowest risk
w.r.t. a surrogate loss function. We also develop an adaptive prediction algo-
rithm to reduce the prediction and certification cost of SWEEN models. Extensive
experiments show that SWEEN models outperform the upper envelope of their cor-
responding base models by a large margin. Moreover, SWEEN models constructed
using a few small models are able to achieve comparable performance to a single
large model with notably reduced training time.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have shown great success in image classification tasks. However, they are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are small imperceptible perturbations of their inputs that
cause misclassification [3, 44]. To settle this issue, various defense methods have been proposed
for training classifiers that are robust to adversarial perturbations. These defenses can be broadly
categorized into empirical defenses and certified defenses. One of the most successful empirical
defenses is adversarial training [24, 31], which optimizes the model by minimizing the loss over
adversarial examples generated during training. Empirical defenses produce models robust to certain
adversaries without theoretical guarantee. In fact, most of the empirical defenses are heuristic and
subsequently broken by more sophisticated adversaries [1, 6, 47, 48]. Certified defenses, either exact
or conservative, mitigate the deficiency in empirical defenses. In the context of lp norm-bounded
perturbations, exact methods report whether an adversarial example exists within an lp ball with
radius r centered at a given input x. Exact methods are usually based on Satisfiability Modulo
Theories [12, 20] or mixed integer linear programming [13, 30], which are computationally inefficient
and not scalable [46]. Conservative methods are more computationally efficient, but might mistakenly
flag a safe data point as vulnerable to adversarial examples [8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 33, 35, 36, 39, 42, 50,
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51, 52, 53, 54, 57]. However, both types of defenses are not scalable to practical networks that can
perform well on modern machine learning problems like the ImageNet [9] classification task.
Recently, a new certified defense technique called randomized smoothing [7, 26] has been proposed. A
(randomized) smoothed classifier is constructed from a base classifier, typically a deep neural network.
It outputs the most probable class given by its base classifier under random noise perturbation of
the input. Randomized smoothing is scalable due to its independency over architectures and has
achieved state-of-the-art certified l2-robustness. In theory, randomized smoothing can apply to any
classifiers. However, naively applying randomized smoothing on standard-trained classifiers leads
to poor robustness results. It is still not completely solved how to train a base classifier so that
the corresponding smoothed classifier has good robustness properties. Recently, Salman et al. [38]
employ adversarial training to train base classifiers and substantially improve the performance of
randomized smoothing. This indicates that techniques originally proposed for empirical defenses can
be useful in finding good base classifiers for randomized smoothing.
In this paper, we consider applying another empirical defense method to randomized smoothing,
namely model ensembling. The idea of model ensembling has been used in various defenses against
adversarial examples, and show promising results [29, 32, 34, 40, 43, 49]. Specifically, we employ a
Smoothed WEighted ENsembling (SWEEN) scheme. We show that SWEEN substantially improves
both the accuracy and robustness of smoothed classifiers. SWEEN does not limit how individual base
classifiers are trained, and thus is compatible with most previously proposed training algorithms on
randomized smoothing.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We employ a weighted ensembling scheme to substantially improve both the accuracy and
robustness of smoothed classifiers. We theoretically demonstrate the best certified robustness
attainable by SWEEN models. Furthermore, we prove that under certain conditions, we can
obtain a SWEEN model which has near-optimal risk attainable by a broad set of functions.
2. We develop an adaptive prediction algorithm for the weighted ensembling, which effectively
reduces the prediction and certification cost of smoothed ensemble classifiers.
3. We evaluate our proposed method through extensive experiments. On all tasks, weighted
ensemble models consistently outperform the upper envelopes of their respective base
models in terms of the approximated certified accuracy by a large margin.
2 Related Work
In the past few years, numerous defenses have been proposed to build classifiers robust to adversarial
examples. Our work typically involves randomized smoothing and model ensembling.
Randomized smoothing Randomized smoothing constructs a smoothed classifier from a base
classifier via convolution between the input distribution and certain noise distribution. It is first
proposed as a heuristic defense by [5, 29]. Lecuyer et al. [26] first prove robustness guarantees for
randomized smoothing utilizing tools from differential privacy. Subsequently, a stronger robustness
guarantee is given by Li et al. [28]. Cohen et al. [7] provide a tight robustness bound for isotropic
Gaussian noise in l2 robustness setting. The theoretical properties of randomized smoothing in various
norm and noise distribution settings have been further discussed in the literature [4, 23, 27, 45, 55].
Recently, a series of works [38, 56] further develop practical algorithms to train a base classifier for
randomized smoothing. From another perspective, our work improves the performance of smoothed
classifiers via weighted ensembling of pretrained base classifiers.
Model ensembling Model ensembling as a technique aiming to improve the generalization per-
formance has been widely studied and applied in machine learning [16, 22]. Krogh and Vedelsby
[22] showed that accurate and diverse networks produce better ensemble classifiers. Recently, simple
averaging of multiple neural networks has been a success in ILSVRC competitions [17, 21, 41].
Model ensembling has also been used in defenses against adversarial examples [29, 32, 34, 40, 43, 49].
Wang et al. [49] have shown that jointly trained ensemble of noise injected ResNets can improve clean
and robust accuracies. Recently, Meng et al. [32] find that an ensemble of many diverse weak models
can be strong against adversarial attacks. Unlike the above works, which are empirical or heuristic,
we employ ensembling in randomized smoothing to provide a theoretical robustness certification.
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3 Preliminaries
Notation Let Y = {e1, e2, ..., eM}, where ek is the M -dimensional one-hot vector whose k-th
entry is 1 for k = 1, ...,M . Sometimes we will use k to refer to ek when there is no ambiguity. Let
∆k = {(p1, p2, ..., pk)
∣∣pi ≥ 0,∑ki=1 pi = 1} be the k-dimensional probability simplex for k ∈ N+,
and ∆ = ∆M . For an M -dimensional function f , we use fi to refer to its i-th entry, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
We use N (0, σ2I) to denote the d-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2I .
We use Φ−1 to denote the inverse of the standard Gaussian CDF, and use Γ to denote the gamma
function. We use R∗ to denote the set of non-negative real numbers. For x, a, b ∈ R, a ≤ b, we define
clip(x; a, b) = min{max{x, a}, b}. We use Ω(·) to denote Big-Omega notation that suppresses
multiplicative constants.
Neural network and classifier Consider a classification problem from X ⊆ Rd to classes Y .
Assume the input space X has finite diameter D = supx1,x2∈X ‖x1 − x2‖2 <∞. The training set
{(xi, yi)}ni=1 is i.i.d. drawn from data distribution D. We call f a probability function or a classifier
if it is a mapping from Rd to ∆ or Y , respectively. For a probability function f , its induced classifier
f∗ is defined such that f∗(x) = ek where k = arg max1≤i≤M fi(x). For simplicity, we will not
distinguish between f and f∗ when there is no ambiguity, and hence all definitions and properties
for classifiers automatically apply to probability functions as well. f(·; θ) denotes a neural network
parameterized by θ ∈ Θ. Here Θ can include hyper-parameters, thus including diverse network
architectures.
Certified robustness We call x+ δ an adversarial example of a classifier F if F correctly classifies
x but F (x+ δ) 6= F (x). Usually ‖δ‖2 is small enough so x+ δ and x appear almost identical for
the human eye. The (l2-)robust radius of F is defined as
r(x, y;F ) = inf
F (x+δ) 6=y
‖δ‖2, (1)
which is the radius of the largest l2 ball centered at x within which F consistently predicts the true
label y of x. Note that r(x, y;F ) = 0 if F (x) 6= y. As mentioned before, we can extend the above
definitions to the case when F is a probability function by considering the induced classifier F ∗. In
most cases r(x, y;F ) is either too computationally expensive to solve exactly, or not tractable at all.
A certified robustness method typically tries to find some lower bound rc(x, y;F ) of r(x, y;F ), and
we call rc a certified radius of F .
Randomized smoothing Let f be a probability function or a classifier. The (randomized) smoothed
function of f is defined as
g(x) = Eδ∼N (0,σ2I)[f(x+ δ)]. (2)
The (randomized) smoothed classifier of f is then defined as g∗. Cohen et al. [7] first provide a tight
robustness guarantee for classifier-based smoothed classifiers, which is summerized in the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. (Cohen et al. [7]) For any classifier f , denote its smoothed function by g. Then
r(x, y; g) ≥ σ
2
[Φ−1(gy(x))− Φ−1(max
k 6=y
gk(x))]. (3)
Later on, Salman et al. [38], Zhai et al. [56] prove that Theorem 1 holds for probability functions as
well.
4 SWEEN: Smoothed weighted ensembling
In this section, we describe the SWEEN framework we use. We also present some theoretical results
for SWEEN models. The proofs of the results in this section can be found in Appendix A.
4.1 SWEEN: Overview
To be specific, we adopt a data-dependent weighted average of neural networks as our ensemble model.
Suppose we have some pre-trained neural networks f(·; θ1), ..., f(·; θK) as ensemble candidates. A
3
weighted ensemble model is then
fens(·; θ, w) =
K∑
k=1
wkf(·; θk), (4)
where θ = (θ1, · · · , θK) ∈ ΘK , and w ∈ ∆K is the ensemble weight. For a specific fens, the
corresponding SWEEN model is defined as the smoothed function of fens, denoted by gens. We have
gens(x; θ, w) = Eδ[
K∑
k=1
wkf(x+ δ; θk)] =
K∑
k=1
wkEδf(x+ δ; θk) =
K∑
k=1
wkg(x; θk), (5)
where g(·; θ) is the smoothed function of f(·; θ). This result means gens is the weighted sum of
the smoothed functions of the ensemble candidates under the same weight w. We can minimize a
surrogate loss of gens over the training set to obtain the value of some appropriate weight. This data
dependent weight makes the ensemble model robust to the presence of some biased base models, as
they will be assigned with small weights.
4.2 Certified robustness of SWEEN models
For a smoothed function g, the certified radius at (x, y) provided by Theorem 1 is rc(x, y; g) =
clip(σ2 [Φ
−1(gy(x)) − Φ−1(maxk 6=y gk(x))]; 0, D). We formally define γ-robustness index as a
metric of certified robustness.
Definition 1. (γ-robustness index). For γ : R∗ → R∗ and a smoothed function g, the γ-robustness
index of g is defined as
Iγ(g) = E(x,y)∼Dγ(rc(x, y; g)). (6)
It can be easily observed that γ-robustness index is an extension of many frequently-used criteria of
certified robustness of smoothed classifiers.
Proposition 1. Let γ1(r) = 1{r ≥ R}, γ2(r) = r, γ3(r) = pi
d
2
Γ( d2 +1)
rd. Then, γ1-robustness index
is the certified accuracy at radius R [7]; γ2-robustness index is the average certified radius [56];
γ3-robustness index is the average volume of the certified region.
We note that criteria considering the volumes of the certified region are sometimes more com-
prehensive than those only considering the certified radii, as they take the input dimension into
account.
Now consider F = {f(·; θ) : Rd → ∆∣∣θ ∈ Θ}, the set of neural networks parametrized over
Θ. The corresponding set of smoothed functions is G = {g(x; θ) = Eδ∼N (0,σ2I)[f(x + δ; θ)]|θ ∈
Θ}. Suppose we rely on some training algorithm to produce base neural networks, which outputs
θ1, · · · , θK drawn i.i.d. from a fixed probability distribution p on Θ. The set of SWEEN models is
then
Fˆθ =
{
φ(x) =
K∑
k=1
wkg(x; θk)
∣∣∣wk ≥ 0, K∑
k=1
wk = 1
}
. (7)
Similar to Rahimi and Recht [37], we consider mixtures of form φ(x) =
∫
Θ
w(θ)g(x; θ)dθ. For a
mixture φ, we define ‖φ‖p := supθ |w(θ)p(θ) |. Define
Fp =
{
φ(x) =
∫
Θ
w(θ)g(x; θ)dθ
∣∣∣ ‖φ‖p <∞, w(θ) ≥ 0,∫
Θ
w(θ)dθ = 1
}
, (8)
note that for any φ ∈ Fp, φ is a smoothed probability function. We have the following result:
Theorem 2. Suppose γ is a Lipschitz function. Given η > 0. For any ε > 0, for sufficently large K,
with probability at least 1− η over θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p, there exists φˆ ∈ Fˆθ which satisfies
Iγ(φˆ) > sup
φ∈Fp
Iγ(φ)− ε. (9)
Moreover, if there exists φ0 ∈ Fp such that Iγ(φ0) = supφ∈Fp Iγ(φ), K = Ω( 1ε4 ).
Theorem 2 states that, if γ is a Lipschitz function and K is large enough, the best γ-robustness index
for a SWEEN model is near the largest γ-robustness index attainable by functions in the classFp
with very high probability.
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4.3 Risk attainable by minimizing the empirical risk
Solving for ensemble weight w over a training set {(xi, yi)}ni=1 can be formulated as
min
w∈∆K
1
n
n∑
i=1
l(
K∑
k=1
wkg(xi; θk), yi), (10)
where l : RM ×Y → R is a surrogate loss function penalizing the predicted probability gap between
the true class and the other classes. However, this process typically invovles Monte Carlo simulation
since we only have access to f(·, θk), k = 1, · · · ,K.
Definition 2. (Risk and empirical risk). For a surrogate loss function l : RM ×Y → R, the risk of a
probability function φ are defined as
R[φ] = E(x,y)∼Dl(φ(x), y). (11)
If φ(x) =
∑K
k=1 wkg(x; θk) ∈ Fˆθ, for training set {(xi, yi)}ni=1 and sample size s, the empirical
risk of φ is defined as
Remp[φ] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
l(
K∑
k=1
wk[
1
s
s∑
j=1
f(xi + δijk; θk)], yi), (12)
where δijk
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2I), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ s, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Now solving for w is equivalent to find the minimizer ofRemp. When the loss function l is convex,
this problem is a low-dimensional convex optimization, so we can obtain the global empirical risk
minimizer using traditional convex optimization algorithms. Furthermore, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 3. Suppose for all y ∈ Y , l(·, y) is a Lipschitz function with constant L which satisfies
l(0, y) = 0. Given η > 0. For any ε > 0, for sufficently large K, if n = Ω(K
2
ε2 ), s = Ω(
logKn
ε2 ),
then with probability at least 1− η over the training dataset {(xi, yi)}ni=1 drawn i.i.d. from D and
the parameters θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p and the noise samples drawn i.i.d. from N (0, σ2I),
the empirical risk minimizer φˆ over Fˆθ satisfies
R[φˆ]− inf
φ∈Fp
R[φ] < ε. (13)
Moreover, if there exists φ0 ∈ Fp such thatR[φ0] = infφ∈Fp R[φ], K = Ω( 1ε4 ).
Theorem 3 gives a guarantee that, for a large enough K,n, s, the gap between risk of the empirical
risk minimizer φˆ and infφ∈Fp R[φ] can be arbitrarily small with high probability. Note that we can
solve φˆ to any given precision when l is convex.
One may wonder whetherFp is big enough to capture some good smoothed functions. Intuitively
Fp is quite a rich set when g(·, θ) is expressive enough. We note that at least the closure of Fp
contains g(·; θ) whenever p(θ) > 0 under some mild assumptions.
Proposition 2. Assume Θ = Rq for some q ∈ N. We further assume g(x; θ) is uniformly continuous
on θ w.r.t. x and p(θ) is continuous on θ. Given θ0 such that p(θ0) > 0, for any ε > 0, there exists
φ ∈ Fp which satisfies ‖g(x; θ0)− φ(x)‖2 < ε,∀x ∈ Rd.
4.4 Adaptive prediction algorithm
A major drawback of ensembling is the high execution cost during inference, which is consisted of
prediction cost and certification cost for smoothed classifiers. The evaluation of smoothed classifiers
relies on Monte Carlo simulation, which is computationally expensive. For instance, Cohen et al.
[7] use 100 Monte Carlo samples for prediction and 100,100 samples for certification. If we use
100 base models for ensembling, then the certification of a single data point will require 10,010,000
local evaluations. Inoue [19] observes that ensembling does not make improvements for inputs
predicted with high probabilities even when they are mispredicted. He proposes an adaptive ensemble
prediction algorithm to reduce the execution cost of unweighted ensemble models. We modify the
algorithm to make it applicative to weighted ensemble models, which is detailed in Algorithm 1. For
a data point, classifiers are evaluated in descending order with respect to their weights. Whenever an
early-exit condition is satisfied, we stop the evaluation and return the current prediction as the output.
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive prediction for weighted ensembling
1: Input: Ensembling weight w ∈ RK , base model parameters θ ∈ ΘK , significance level α,
threshold T , data point x
2: Compute z = Φ−1(1− α2 )
3: Set pi as the permutation of indices that sorts w in descending order and i← 0
4: repeat
5: Set i← i+ 1
6: Compute the wpii -th local prediction ppii ← (ppii,1, · · · , ppii,M ) ∈ ∆
7: Compute pˆi,k ←
∑i
j=1 wpij ppij,k∑i
j=1 wpij
for k = 1, 2, · · ·M
8: Compute ki ← arg maxk pˆi,k
9: until pˆ1,k1 > T or pˆi,ki > 12 + z
√∑i
j=1 w
2
pij∑i
j=1 wpij
√∑i
j=1 wpij (ppij,ki−pˆi,ki )2∑i
j=1 wpij
, i > 1 or i = K
10: return ki and pˆi,k, k = 1, 2, · · ·M
5 Experiments
We empirically evaluate the performance of SWEEN models on standard image classification datasets.
5.1 Setup
Model setup We train different network architectures on CIFAR-10 and SVHN to serve as base
models for ensembling, including LeNet [25], AlexNet [21], ResNet-20, ResNet-26, ResNet-32,
ResNet-110, DenseNet [18] (depth=100), VGG-16 [41], VGG-19. We particularly evaluate two
compositions of the SWEEN models. The first is a relatively rich set of models, including LeNet,
AlexNet, ResNet-20, ResNet-110, DenseNet, VGG-16, VGG-19, denoted by the 7-model-ensemble.
The second is a small set of small models, including ResNet-20, ResNet-26, ResNet-32, denoted
by the 3-model-ensemble. The 7-model-ensemble and the 3-model-ensemble simulate how much a
weighted ensemble scheme can help in scenarios when we have an adequate and limited number of
base models, respectively. The noise level σ are fixed across the smoothed ensemble model and its
base models, as well as during training and certification.
Base model Training We train base models using two training schemes, including Gaussian data
augmentation training [7], which is denoted as standard training for simplicity, and MACER training
[56]. Base models for the same ensemble model are trained with an identical training scheme. All
hyper-parameters used in our experiments are listed in Appendix B.1.
Solving the ensembling weight From Section 4 we know that we can obtain the empirical risk
minimizer by solving a convex optimization. However, this requires first to approximate the value of
smoothed functions of base models at every data point, which can be very costly when the number of
base models and training data points is large. Hence, we use Gaussian data augmented training to
solve the ensembling weight, which is much faster and yields comparable results empirically.
Certification Following previous works, we use the approximated certified accuracy (ACA), which
is defined as the fraction of the test set that can be certified to be robust at radius r, as the metric of
performance. We also report the average certified radius (ACR) following Zhai et al. [56]. All results
were certified with N = 100, 000 samples and failure probability α = 0.001.
5.2 Results
Standard training on CIFAR-10 Table 1 displays the performance of two kinds of SWEEN
models under noise levels σ ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 1.00}. We also report the upper envelopes of ACA and
ACR of their corresponding base models and the performance of a single ResNet-110 for comparison.
In Figure 1 we display the radius-accuracy curves for the ensemble models and all their respective
base models under σ = 0.50 on CIFAR-10. For all noise levels, the 7-model-ensemble and the
3-model-ensemble both outperform the upper envelope of their corresponding base models and the
single ResNet-110 at all radii.
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Table 1: ACA (%) and ACR on CIFAR-10. All models are trained via standard training. * means the
upper envelope of base models.
σ Model 0.00 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 ACR
0.25
ResNet-110 79.6 65.2 50.8 34.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.489
3-model* 80.5 65.6 47.9 30.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.470
3-model 82.3 69.8 54.7 35.9 0 0 0 0 0 0.520
7-model* 80.5 67.9 52.2 36.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.506
7-model 84.2 72.0 58.7 43.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.560
0.50
ResNet-110 68.7 58.6 46.7 35.4 25.0 17.0 9.0 4.6 0 0.573
3-model* 69.6 58.3 45.8 33.7 23.0 15.8 9.2 4.7 0 0.556
3-model 70.9 61.4 50.8 38.3 27.7 20.1 12.8 6.7 0 0.630
7-model* 68.6 58.9 46.6 34.8 24.7 16.5 10.2 5.3 0 0.574
7-model 71.2 63.0 52.2 41.9 31.2 22.9 15.3 8.3 0 0.678
1.00
ResNet-110 51.4 44.9 37.9 31.8 24.6 18.8 13.8 10.2 6.7 0.559
3-model* 50.6 44.7 38.2 30.8 24.6 18.5 13.6 10.5 7.0 0.555
3-model 51.9 45.5 39.3 32.3 25.9 19.7 15.4 11.4 8.1 0.595
7-model* 52.0 45.7 37.9 31.9 25.1 19.2 13.9 10.1 7.2 0.557
7-model 52.7 46.3 39.8 34.0 27.6 22.7 17.9 12.6 9.2 0.631
Figure 1: Radius-accuracy curves under σ = 0.50 on CIFAR-10. All models are trained via standard
training. (Left) The 7-model-ensemble and all its base models. (Middle) The 3-model-ensemble and
all its base models. (Right) The 7-model-ensemble, the 3-model-ensemble and the ResNet-110.
MACER training on CIFAR-10 The results are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. For the
approximate certified accuracy and ACR of the ResNet-110 model, we use the original numbers
from Zhai et al. [56]. We can see that the performance of the 3-model-ensemble matches that of the
ResNet-110. However, the total number of parameters of the 3-model ensemble is only approximately
64% of that of the ResNet-110. The total training time of the 3-model-ensemble (33.9 hours) is much
less than that of the ResNet-110 (49.4 hours) as well.
Adaptive prediction ensembling We apply the previously mentioned adaptive prediction algo-
rithm on the 7-model-ensemble models via standard training on CIFAR-10 to evaluate its effectiveness.
Table 2: ACA (%) and ACR on CIFAR-10. All models are trained via MACER training. * means the
upper envelope of base models.
σ Model 0.00 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2 ACR
0.25
ResNet-110 81 71 59 43 0 0 0 0 0 0.556
3-model* 77.4 66.9 56.8 41.9 0 0 0 0 0 0.529
3-model 77.7 68.7 60.3 46.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.558
0.50
ResNet-110 66 60 53 46 38 29 19 12 0 0.726
3-model* 64.9 57.1 49.7 41.1 34.1 26.2 20.2 11.7 0 0.685
3-model 64.7 58.4 51.8 43.9 37.2 29.2 22.8 14.6 0 0.725
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Table 3: Training time for models under σ = 0.50 via MACER training.
Model sec/epoch #epochs Total hrs
ResNet-110 404.2 440 49.4
ResNet-20 72.2 440 8.8
ResNet-26 92.9 440 11.3
ResNet-32 113.2 440 13.8
Weight 0.6 150 0.025
Ensemble - - 33.9
Table 4: ACA (%) and ACR on CIFAR-10. All models are trained via standard training. * means the
upper envelope of base models.
σ Model 0.00 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 ACR #evals/img
0.25 Normal 84.2 72.0 58.7 43.0 0 0 0 0 0.560 700,700Adaptive 84.3 71.5 57.6 41.2 0 0 0 0 0.549 283,727
0.50 Normal 71.2 63.0 52.2 41.9 31.2 22.9 15.3 8.3 0.678 700,700Adaptive 70.9 62.8 52.3 41.6 31.1 22.8 14.5 7.8 0.672 382,426
The results are summarized in Table 4. It can be observed that the adaptive prediction models require
much fewer evaluations to certify an image. However, the performance of the adaptive prediction
models is only slightly worse than their vanilla counterparts.
Results on SVHN To further evaluate our method, we also experiment on SVHN. The results show
that SWEEN models outperform the upper envelopes of their corresponding base models as well.
Figure 2 plots the results on CIFAR-10 and SVHN for comparison.
Figure 2: Comparing ensembles to the upper envelopes of their corresponding base models. All
models are trained via standard training. (Left) The 3-model-ensemble on CIFAR-10. (Middle) The
7-model-ensemble on CIFAR-10. (Right) The 7-model-ensemble on SVHN.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we introduced the smoothed weighted ensembling (SWEEN) to improve randomized
smoothed classifiers in terms of both the accuracy and robustness. We theoretically demonstrated the
certified robustness and risk attainable by SWEEN models. Moreover, We developed an adaptive
prediction algorithm to accelerate the prediction and certification process of SWEEN models. Our
extensive experiments showed that an properly designed weighted ensemble model was able to
consistently outperform all its base models by a significant margin. This suggested that SWEEN is a
viable tool for improving the performance of randomized smoothing models.
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Broader Impact
Randomized smoothing, as a provable defense against adversarial examples, helps to defend against
potential adversaries who will attack the system. In this work we employ SWEEN to improve the
performance of randomized smoothed classifiers, which may lead to more robust machine learning
systems in the real world application. At the same time, SWEEN models often have more computation
cost comparing to a single model on prediction and certification phase, which may have some negative
consequences in the society. Furthermore, we should be cautious of the result of failure of the system
which could cause a drop of the performance, or a waste of computational resources.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Define
F ′p =
{
φ(x) =
∫
Θ
w(θ)g(x; θ)dθ
∣∣∣ ‖φ‖p <∞, w(θ) ≥ 0} , (14)
Fˆ ′θ =
{
φ(x) =
K∑
k=1
wkg(x; θk)
∣∣∣wk ≥ 0} . (15)
We haveFp ⊆ F ′p, Fˆθ ⊆ Fˆ ′θ.
Lemma 1. Let µ be any probability measure on Rd. For φ : Rd → RM , define the norm ‖φ‖2µ ,∫
Rd ‖φ(x)‖22dµ(x). Fix φ ∈ F ′p, then for any η > 0, with probability at least 1− η over θ1, ..., θK
drawn i.i.d. from p, there exists φˆ(x) =
K∑
k=1
ckg(x; θk) ∈ Fˆ ′θ which satisfies
‖φˆ− φ‖µ ≤ ‖φ‖p√
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
). (16)
Proof. Sine φ ∈ F ′p, we can write φ(x) =
∫
Θ
w(θ)g(x; θ)dθ, where w(θ) ≥ 0. Con-
struct φk = βkg(·; θk), k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, where βk = w(θk)p(θk) , then Eφk = φ, ‖φk‖µ =√∫
Rd β
2
k‖g(x; θk)‖22dµ(x) ≤ |βk| ≤ ‖φ‖p. We then define
u(θ1, · · · , θK) = ‖ 1
K
K∑
k=1
φk − φ‖µ. (17)
First, by using Jensen’s inequality and the fact that ‖φk‖µ ≤ ‖φ‖p, we have
E[u(θ)] ≤
√
E[u2(θ)] =
√√√√E[‖ 1
K
K∑
k=1
φk − Eφk‖2µ] =
√
1
K
(E‖φk‖2µ − ‖Eφk‖2µ) ≤
‖φ‖p√
K
.
Next, for θ1, · · · , θM and θ˜i, we have
|u(θ1, · · · , θM )− u(θ1, · · · , θ˜i, · · · , θM )|
= |‖ 1
K
K∑
k=1
φk − φ‖µ − ‖ 1
K
(
K∑
k=1,k 6=i
φk + φ˜i)− φ‖µ|
≤ ‖ 1
K
M∑
k=1
φk − 1
K
(
M∑
k=1,k 6=i
φk + φ˜i)‖µ
=
‖φi − φ˜i‖µ
K
≤ 2‖φ‖p
K
.
Now we can use McDiarmid’s inequality to bound u(θ), which gives
P[u(θ)− ‖φ‖p√
K
≥ ε] ≤ P[u(θ)− Eu(θ) ≥ ε] ≤ exp(− Kε
2
2‖φ‖2p
). (18)
The theorem follows by setting δ to the right hand side and solving ε.
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Lemma 2. Let µ be any probability measure on Rd. For φ : Rd → RM , define the norm ‖φ‖2µ ,∫
Rd ‖φ(x)‖22dµ(x), then for any η > 0, for K ≥M‖φ‖2p(1 +
√
2 log 1η )
2, with probability at least
1− η over θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p, there exists φˆ(x) =
K∑
k=1
ckg(x; θk) ∈ Fˆθ which satisfies
‖φˆ− φ‖µ < 2
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
)
1
2 . (19)
Proof. Fix φ ∈ Fp ⊆ F ′p, by using Lemma 1, we have that for any δ > 0, with probability at least
1− η over θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p, there exists φ˜(x) =
K∑
k=1
ckg(x; θk) ∈ Fˆ ′θ which satisfies
‖φ˜− φ‖µ < ‖φ‖p√
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
) , B(K). (20)
Denote C =
K∑
k=1
ck, and define s(t) ,
M∑
i=1
ti as the sum of all elements of t ∈ RM . Then
s(g(x; θ)) = 1,∀x ∈ Rd, θ ∈ Θ. Thus,
s(φ(x)) =
M∑
i=1
φi(x) =
M∑
i=1
∫
Θ
w(θ)gi(x; θ)dθ =
∫
Θ
w(θ)
M∑
i=1
gi(x; θ)dθ =
∫
Θ
w(θ)dθ = 1,
s(φ˜(x)) =
M∑
i=1
φ˜i(x) =
M∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
ckgi(x; θk) =
K∑
k=1
ck
M∑
i=1
gi(x; θk) =
K∑
k=1
ck = C.
Now we have
B(K)2 > ‖φ˜− φ‖2µ =
∫
Rd
‖φ˜(x)− φ(x)‖22dµ(x)
≥
∫
Rd
(s(φ˜(x)− φ(x)))2
M
dµ(x)
=
∫
Rd
(C − 1)2
M
dµ(x)
=
(C − 1)2
M
,
which gives 1−√MB(K) < C < 1 +√MB(K). Construct φˆ(x) = φ˜(x)C , then φˆ ∈ Fˆθ and
‖φˆ− φ‖2µ =
∫
Rd
‖φˆ(x)− φ(x)‖22dµ(x)
=
∫
Rd
‖C−1φ˜(x)− φ(x)||22dµ(x)
=
∫
Rd
‖(φ˜(x)− φ(x)) + (C−1 − 1)φ˜(x)‖22dµ(x)
=
∫
Rd
(‖φ˜(x)− φ(x)‖22 + ‖(C−1 − 1)φ˜(x)‖22 + 2(C−1 − 1)〈φ˜(x)− φ(x), φ˜(x)〉)dµ(x)
=
∫
Rd
(‖φˆ(x)− φ(x)‖22 + (C−2 − 1)‖φ˜(x)‖22 + 2(1− C−1)〈φ(x), φ˜(x)〉)dµ(x).
Sine we have C
2
M ≤ ‖φ˜(x)‖22 ≤ C2, |〈φ(x), φ˜(x)〉| ≤
√
‖φ(x)‖22‖φ˜(x)‖22 ≤ C, it holds that
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(i) When 1 < C < 1 +
√
MB(K),
‖φˆ− φ‖2µ ≤
∫
Rd
(‖φ˜(x)− φ(x)‖22 +
1− C2
M
+ 2(C − 1))dµ(x)
≤ B(K)2 + 1− C
2
M
+ 2(C − 1)
≤ −2B(K)√
M
+ 2
√
MB(K);
(ii) When 1−√MB(K) < C ≤ 1,
‖φˆ− φ‖2µ ≤
∫
Rd
(‖φ˜(x)− φ(x)‖22 + (1− C2) + 2(1− C))dµ(x)
≤ B(K)2 + 4− (1 + C)2
≤ 4
√
MB(K)− (M − 1)B(K)2
< 4
√
MB(K).
Thus, with probability at least 1− η over θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p,
‖φˆ− φ‖µ < 2
√√
MB(K) = 2
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
)
1
2 .
Lemma 3. Suppose l(·, ·) is L-Lipschitz in its first argument. Fix φ ∈ Fp, then for any η > 0, for
K ≥ M‖φ‖2p(1 +
√
2 log 1η )
2, with probability at least 1 − η over θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p,
there exists φˆ ∈ Fˆθ which satisfies
|E(x,y)∼D[l(φˆ(x), y)]− E(x,y)∼D[l(φ(x), y)]| < 2L
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
)
1
2 .
Proof.
|E[l(φˆ(x), y)]− E[l(φ(x), y)]| ≤ E|c(φ(x), y)− c(φˆ(x), y)|
≤ LE‖φ(x)− φˆ(x)‖2
≤ L
√
E‖φ(x)− φˆ(x)‖22
= L‖φ− φˆ‖D|x
The desired result follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. (Corollary of Proposition 1 in Zhai et al. [56]) Given any p1, p2, · · · , pM satisfies p1 ≥
p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pM ≥ 0 and p1+p2+· · ·+pM = 1. The derivative of clip(σ2 [Φ−1(p1)−Φ−1(p2)]; 0, D)
with respect to p1 and p2 is bounded.
Now we can prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let φ0 ∈ Fp such that Iγ(φ0) > supφ∈Fp Iγ(φ) − ε2 . From Lemma 4 we
know that q(p, y) , clip(σ2 [Φ−1(py) − Φ−1(maxk 6=y pk)]; 0, D) is Lipschitz in its first argument.
Since m is Lipschitz, c(p, y) , m(q(p, y)) is also Lipschitz in its first argument with some constant
L. Apply Lemma 3, we have that for K ≥ M‖φ‖2p(1 +
√
1 + 2 log 1δ )
2, with probability at least
1− η over θ1, ..., θK drawn i.i.d. from p, there exists φˆ ∈ Fˆθ which satisfies
Iγ(φ0)− Iγ(φˆ) = E(x,y)∼D[l(φ0(x), y)]− E(x,y)∼D[l(φˆ(x), y)]
< 2L
√
‖φ0‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
)
1
2 .
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When K >
256L4‖φ0‖2pM(1+
√
2 log 1η )
2
ε4 , we have
sup
φ∈Fp
Iγ(φ)− Iγ(φˆ) = ( sup
φ∈Fp
Iγ(φ)− Iγ(φ0)) + (Iγ(φ0)− Iγ(φˆ)) < ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
If Iγ(φ0) = supφ∈Fp Iγ(φ), which means ‖φ0‖p is independent of ε, K = Ω( 1ε4 ).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
First we introduce some results from statistical learning theory.
Definition 3. (Gaussian complexity). Let µ be a probability distribution on a set X and suppose that
x1, ..., xn are independent samples selected according to µ. LetF be a class of functions mapping
from X to R. The Gaussian complexity ofF is
Gn[F ] , E[ sup
f∈F
| 2
n
n∑
i=1
ξif(xi)|
∣∣x1, ..., xn; ξi, ..., ξn]
where ξ1, ..., ξn are independent N (0, 1) random variables.
Definition 4. (Rademacher complexity) Let µ be a probability distribution on a set X and suppose
that x1, ..., xn are independent samples selected according to µ. Let F be a class of functions
mapping from X to R. The Rademacher complexity ofF is
Rn[F ] , E[ sup
f∈F
| 2
n
n∑
i=1
σif(xi)|
∣∣x1, ..., xn;σi, ..., σn]
where σ1, ..., σn are independent uniform {±1}-valued random variables.
Lemma 5. (Part of Lemma 4 in Bartlett and Mendelson [2]). There are absolute constants β such
that for every classF and every integer n, Rn(F ) ≤ βGn(F ).
Lemma 6. (Corollary of Theorem 8 in Bartlett and Mendelson [2]). Consider a loss function
c : A × Y → [0, 1]. Let F be a class of functions mapping from X to A and let (xi, yi)ni=1 be
independently selected according to the probability measure µ. Then, for any integer n and any
0 < η < 1, with probability at least 1− η over samples of length n, every f inF satisfies
E(x,y)∼µ[c(f(x), y)] ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(f(xi), yi) +Rn[c˜ ◦F ] +
√
8 log 2η
n
,
where c˜ ◦F = {(x, y) 7→ c(f(x), y)− c(0, y)∣∣f ∈ F}
Lemma 7. (Corollary of Theorem 14 in Bartlett and Mendelson [2]). Let A = RM and letF be
a class of functions mapping from X to A. Suppose that there are real-valued classesF1, ...,FM
such thatF is a subset of their Cartesian product. Assume further that c : A× Y → R is such that,
for all y ∈ Y , c(·, y) is a Lipschitz function with constant L which passes through the origin and is
uniformly bounded. Then
Gn(c ◦F ) ≤ 2L
M∑
i=1
Gn(Fi).
Now we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 8. Let c,F , (xi, yi)ni=1, c˜◦F be as in Lemma 6. Then, for any integer n and any 0 < η < 1,
with probability at least 1− η over samples of length n, every f inF satisfies
1
n
n∑
i=1
c(f(xi), yi) ≤ E(x,y)∼µ[c(f(x), y)] +Rn[c˜ ◦F ] +
√
8 log 2η
n
.
Proof.
1
n
n∑
i=1
c(f(xi), yi)− E(x,y)∼µ[c(f(x), y)] ≤ sup
h∈c◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh)
= sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh) + Eˆnc(0, y)− Ec(0, y).
16
When an (xi, yi) pair changes, the random variable sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh) can change by no more than
2
n . McDiarmid’s inequality implies that with probability at least 1− η2 ,
sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh) ≤ E sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh) +
√
2 log 2η
n
.
A similar argument, together with the fact that EEˆnc(0, y) = Ec(0, y), shows that with probability at
least 1− η,
Remp[f ] ≤ R[f ] + E sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh) +
√
8 log 2η
n
.
It’s left to show that E sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh − Eh) ≤ Rn[c˜ ◦F ]. Let (x′1, y′1), ..., (x′n, y′n) be drawn i.i.d.
from µ and independent from (xi, yi)ni=1, then
E sup
h∈c˜◦F
(Eˆnh− Eh) = E sup
h∈c˜◦F
E[Eˆnh− 1
n
n∑
i=1
h(x′i, y
′
i)]
≤ EE sup
h∈c˜◦F
[Eˆnh− 1
n
n∑
i=1
h(x′i, y
′
i)]
= E sup
h∈c˜◦F
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
h(xi, yi)−
n∑
i=1
h(x′i, y
′
i))
≤ 2E sup
h∈c˜◦F
1
n
n∑
i=1
σih(xi, yi)
≤ Rn[c˜ ◦F ].
We can prove the following result:
Theorem 4. Let A = RM and let F be a class of functions mapping from X to A. Suppose that
there are real-valued classesF1, ...,FM such thatF is a subset of their Cartesian product. Assume
further that the loss function c : A×Y → R is such that, for all y ∈ Y , c(·, y) is a Lipschitz function
with constant L which passes through the origin and is uniformly bounded. Let {(xi, yi)}ni=1 be
independently selected according to the probability measure µ. Then, for any integer n and any
0 < η < 1, there is a probability of at least 1− η that every f ∈ F has
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(f(xi), yi)− E(x,y)∼µ[c(f(x), y)]| ≤ βL
M∑
j=1
Gn[Fj ] +
√
8 log 4η
n
,
where β is a constant.
Proof. From Lemma 6 and 8 we have that with probability at least 1− η over samples of length n,
every f inF satisfies
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(f(xi), yi)− E(x,y)∼µ[c(f(x), y)]| ≤ Rn[c˜ ◦F ] +
√
8 log 4η
n
,
it follows by applying Lemma 5 and 7.
Lemma 9. Let c(·, ·), β be as in Theorem 4. Let (xi, yi)ni=1 be independently selected according to
the probability measure D. For any integer n and any 0 < η < 1, there is a probability of at least
1− η that every f ∈ Fˆθ has
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(f(xi), yi)− E(x,y)∼D[c(f(x), y)]| ≤ 2βLMK√
n
+
√
8 log 4η
n
.
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Proof. Denote
Fˆθ(i) =
{
φ(x) =
K∑
k=1
wkgi(x;wk)
∣∣∣wk ≥ 0, K∑
k=1
wk = 1
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤M.
We have that Fˆθ ⊆
M⊗
k=1
Fˆθ(i), where
⊗
stands for a Cartesian product operation. The Gaussian
comlexities of Fˆθ(i)’s can be bounded as
Gn[Fˆθ(j)] = Ex,ξ[ sup
φ∈Fˆθ(j)
| 2
n
n∑
i=1
ξiφ(xi)|]
= Ex,ξ[sup
w
| 2
n
n∑
i=1
ξi
K∑
k=1
wkgj(xi;wk)|]
= Ex,ξ[sup
w
|
K∑
k=1
wk
2
n
n∑
i=1
ξigj(xi;wk)|]
≤ Ex,ξ[2
K∑
k=1
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
ξigj(xi;wk)|]
≤ Ex[2
K∑
k=1
√√√√Eg( 1
n
n∑
i=1
ξigj(xi;wk))2]
= Ex[2
K∑
k=1
√√√√ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
gj(xi;wk)2]
≤ Ex[2
K∑
k=1
√
1
n
]
=
2K√
n
.
The desired result follows by applying Theorem 4 to Fˆθ, Fˆθ(1), · · · , Fˆθ(M) and D.
Next, we give the definition of semi-empirical risk. The term "semi-" implies that it is empirical with
respect to the training set but not the smoothing operation.
Definition 5. (Semi-empirical risk). For a surrogate loss function l(·, ·) : RM × RM → R and
training set {(xi, yi)}ni=1, the semi-empirical risk of φ(x) =
∑K
k=1 wkg(x; θk) ∈ Fˆθ are defined as
Rse[φ] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
l(
K∑
k=1
wkg(xi; θk), yi). (21)
We can use Lemma 3 and 9 to prove the following result:
Theorem 5. Suppose for all y ∈ Y , l(·, y) is a Lipschitz function with constant L which passes
through the origin and is uniformly bounded. Fix φ ∈ Fp, then for any η > 0, with probability at
least 1− η over the training dataset {(xi, yi)}ni=1 drawn i.i.d. from D and the parameters θ1, ..., θK
drawn i.i.d. from p, the semi-empirical risk minimizer φˆ over Fˆθ satisfies
R[φˆ]−R[φ] <
4βLMK + 4
√
2 log 8η√
n
+ 2L
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
2
η
)
1
2 ,
where β is a constant.
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Proof. Let φ∗ be the minimizer of R over Fˆθ. Combine Lemma 3 and 9, we derive that, with
probability at least 1− 2δ over the training dataset and the choice of the parameters θ1, ..., θK ,
R[φˆ]−R[φ] = (R[φˆ]−Rse[φˆ]) + (Rse[φˆ]−Rse[φ∗]) + (Rse[φ∗]−R[φ∗]) + (R[φ∗]−R[φ])
<
2βLMK + 2
√
2 log 4η√
n
+ 0 +
2βLMK + 2
√
2 log 4η√
n
+ 2L
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
)
1
2
=
4βLMK + 4
√
2 log 4η√
n
+ 2L
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
)
1
2 .
Lemma 10. Let µ be a probability distribution on ∆. For any η > 0, with probability at least 1− η
over x1, ..., xs drawn i.i.d. from µ, it holds that
‖1
s
s∑
i=1
xi − Ex∼µ[x]‖2 ≤ 1√
s
(1 +
√
2 log
1
η
) (22)
Proof. Define u(x1, · · · , xs) = ‖ 1s
∑s
i=1 xi − E[x]‖2. By using Jensen’s inequality, we have
E[u(x)] ≤
√
E[u2(x)] =
√√√√E[‖1
s
s∑
i=1
xi − E[x]‖22] =
√
1
s
(E‖x‖22 − ‖E[x]‖22) ≤
1√
s
.
Next, for x1, · · · , xM and x˜k, we have
|u(x1, · · · , xs)− u(x1, · · · , x˜k, · · · , xs)|
= |‖1
s
s∑
i=1
xi − E[x]‖2 − ‖1
s
(
s∑
i=1,i6=k
xi + x˜k)− E[x]‖2|
≤ ‖1
s
s∑
i=1
xi − 1
s
(
s∑
i=1,i6=k
xi + x˜k)‖2
=
‖xk − x˜k‖2
s
≤ 2
s
.
Now we can use McDiarmid’s inequality to bound u(x), which gives
P[u(x)− 1√
s
≥ ε] ≤ P[u(x)− Eu(x) ≥ ε] ≤ exp(−sε
2
2
). (23)
The result follows by setting η to the right hand side and solving ε.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let φ0 ∈ Fp such that R[φ0] < infφ∈Fp R[φ] + ε4 . By Lemma 10, with
probability at least 1− η3 ,
‖1
s
s∑
j=1
f(xi + δijk; θk)− g(xi; θk)‖2 ≤
1 +
√
2 log 3Knη√
s
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, (24)
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hold simultaneously. So with probability at least 1− η3 , for every φ =
∑K
k=1 wkg(x; θk) ∈ Fˆθ, it
holds that
|Remp[φ]−Rse[φ]| = | 1
n
n∑
i=1
[l(
K∑
k=1
wk[
1
s
s∑
j=1
f(xi + δijk; θk)], yi)− l(
K∑
k=1
wkg(xi; θk), yi)]|
≤ L
n
n∑
i=1
‖
K∑
k=1
wk[
1
s
s∑
j=1
f(xi + δijk; θk)− g(xi; θk)]‖2
≤ L
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
wk‖1
s
s∑
j=1
f(xi + δijk; θk)− g(xi; θk)‖2
≤ L
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
wk
1 +
√
2 log 3Knη√
s
=
L(1 +
√
2 log 3Knη )√
s
, ε1.
By Lemma 9, with probability at least 1− η3 , for every φ ∈ Fˆθ, it holds that
|Rse[φ]−R[φ]| ≤ 2βLMK√
n
+
√
8 log 12η
n
, ε2.
Let φ∗ be the minimizer of R over Fˆθ. By Lemma 3, with probability at least 1 − δ3 , for K ≥
M‖φ0‖2p(1 +
√
2 log 3η )
2,
R[φ∗]−R[φ0] < 2L
√
‖φ‖p 4
√
M
K
(1 +
√
2 log
3
η
)
1
2 , ε3.
So with probability at least 1− η, it holds that
R[φˆ]− inf
φ∈Fp
R[φ] = (R[φˆ]−Rse[φˆ]) + (Rse[φˆ]−Remp[φˆ]) + (Remp[φˆ]−Remp[φ∗])
+(Remp[φ∗]−Rse[φ∗]) + (Rse[φ∗]−R[φ∗]) + (R[φ∗]−R[φ0]) + (R[φ0]− inf
φ∈Fp
R[φ])
< ε2 + ε1 + 0 + ε1 + ε2 + ε3 +
ε
4
= 2ε1 + 2ε2 + ε3 +
ε
4
.
When K >
256L4‖φ0‖2pM(1+
√
2 log 1η )
2
ε4 , n >
64(2βLMK+
√
8 log 12η )
2
ε2 , s >
64L2(1+
√
2 log 3Knη )
2
ε2 , we
have
R[φˆ]− inf
φ∈Fp
R[φ] < ε. (25)
IfR[φ0] = infφ∈Fp R[φ], which means ‖φ0‖p is independent of ε, K = Ω( 1ε4 ).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. For a > 0, define ζa(θ) = e−a‖θ0−θ‖
2
2p(θ) and wa(θ) =
ζa(θ)∫
Θ
ζa(θ)dθ
. Then
φa(x) =
∫
Θ
wa(θ)g(x; θ)dθ ∈ Fp. For any ε > 0, there exists δ1, δ2 > 0, s.t. ‖g(x; θ0) −
g(x; θ)‖2 ≤ ε2 ,∀‖θ − θ0‖2 ≤ δ1 and p(θ) > p(θ0)2 ,∀‖θ − θ0‖2 ≤ δ2. Let δ = min(δ1, δ2), we can
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choose a sufficiently large so that
∫
B(θ0,δ)
wa(θ)dθ ≥ 1− ε28 . Then for ∀x ∈ Rd, we have
‖g(x; θ0)− φ(x)‖22 = ‖
∫
Θ
wa(θ)[g(x; θ0)− g(x; θ)]dθ‖22
≤
∫
Θ
wa(θ)‖g(x; θ0)− g(x; θ)‖22dθ
= (
∫
B(θ0,δ)
+
∫
Θ\B(θ0,δ)
)wa(θ)‖g(x; θ0)− g(x; θ)‖22dθ
≤
∫
B(θ0,δ)
ε2wa(θ)
4
dθ +
∫
Θ\B(θ0,δ)
4wa(θ)dθ
≤ ε
2
4
+
ε2
2
< ε2.
B Supplementary material for experiments
B.1 Detailed settings and hyper-parameters
We perform all experiments on a single GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
For training the SWEEN models, we divide the training set into two parts, one for training base
models, and the other for solving weights. We employ 2,000 images for solving weights on CIFAR-10
and 3000 images for solving weights on SVHN. Models not for ensembling are trained on the full
training set.
For Gaussian data augmentation training, all the models are trained for 400 epochs using SGD. The
learning rate is initialized set as 0.01, and decayed by 0.1 at the 150th/300th epoch.
For MACER training, we use the same hyper-parameters as Zhai et al. [56], i.e., we use k = 16, β =
16.0, γ = 8.0, and we use λ = 12.0 for σ = 0.25 and λ = 4.0 for σ = 0.50. We train the models for
440 epochs, the learning rate is initialized set as 0.01, and decayed by 0.1 at the 200th/400th epoch.
B.2 MACER training on CIFAR-10
Figure 3: Radius-accuracy curves for ensembles with base classifiers trained by MACER on CIFAR-
10. (Left) σ = 0.25. (Right) σ = 0.50.
B.3 Results on SVHN
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Table 5: Certified accuracy (%) and ACR on SVHN. All models are trained via standard training. *
means the upper envelope of base models.
σ Model 0.00 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2 ACR
0.25 7-model* 90.3 74.6 53.4 29.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.5177-model 91.0 76.4 56.8 34.7 0 0 0 0 0 0.547
0.50 7-model* 72.7 58.1 42.1 28.4 17.7 11.0 6.5 3.1 0 0.4987-model 72.8 59.2 43.9 29.4 19.8 11.9 7.3 3.7 0 0.524
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